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ABSTRACT
Church, Donald G., M.S.I.H.E., Department of Biomedical, Industrial and Human
Factors Engineering, Wright State University, 2015. Reducing Error Rates in
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Anomaly Detection via Information
Presentation Optimization.

In the ISR domain, time-critical decision-making and dealing with multiple
information feeds places high demands on the human. When designing aids and tools,
the decision maker must be taken into account. This research looks toward designing a
decision aid based the personality type of the operator. The BFI is used to determine the
impact of personality and decision aid type (graphical vs. textual) on performance.
Results show Openness and Agreeableness to be the strongest single factors for decision
aid impact on performance. A model was also developed to show how the human takes
the information and relates it to a mental model for use in making an identification. This
can assist the ISR community in developing an adaptive aiding system to reduce the cycle
time in the decision making process and have the greatest impact on performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) domain,
information processing and correlation tasks rely heavily on computer-filtered data as
well as workflow tools and aids to communicate this data in an effective and efficient
manner (Rovira, Cross, Leitch, & Bonaceto, 2014). Particularly for visual search tasks,
the performance of the joint cognitive system (JCS) is reliant on the performance of the
human making the decisions. Machines have the advantage of consistency, while
humans make judgments based on past experiences, training, and current perceptions,
adapting and changing constantly. Identical circumstances and inputs may produce
different results due to a difference in fatigue, mood, perception, environment, or any
number of other factors. Part of what defines expert operators in a given situation is their
ability to produce consistent results on demand (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson,
2008). It can therefore be difficult to test changes in human mental processes since any
changes in the human operating paradigm are subject to past experiences and habits.
From a system design perspective, then, it is simpler (although perhaps not as
economical) to modify the system with which the human is interacting than to completely
re-train human operators. The question, then, becomes how to effectively engineer a
system to take into account the human in order to produce better performance,
specifically in area of visual processing in the ISR domain.
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Numerous solutions have been presented to improve human performance via
machine aid—especially in the form of decision support systems (Card, Mackinlay,
Shneiderman, 1999; Tegarden, 1999; Wickens & Xu, 2002; Ware, 2012; Chen, 2013,
Wickens et al., 2013). There still is a limit to the improvement possible due to the human
operator’s ability to understand and make the necessary decisions to accomplish the task.
To that end, it behooves the diligent engineer to design a system such that the end user is
exposed to, but more importantly understands, the information needed to perform their
role in the joint cognitive system.
The human as a decision-maker is the crux of the design dilemma. Automated
decision-making has raised the stakes in situations where humans are required to make
decisions. Trivial decisions have been automated so that every decision presented to the
user is complex and important. (Galster, Bolia, & Parasuraman, 2002; Rovira, McGarry,
& Parasuraman, 2007; Rovira, Cross, Leitch, & Bonaceto, 2014; Sarter & Schroeder,
2001; Wickens & Xu, 2002) In such situations, humans must depend on decision aids to
present the necessary information quickly, accurately, and—most importantly—in an
understandable format.
In order to address the problem of system design optimization, it is necessary to
first understand the differences in end users such that design decisions made conform not
merely to the overall “best” candidates, but instead to the major groups of users
differentiated by some objective measure. To explain this, consider the desired
functionality of any given decision aid—to improve the performance of a human
2

interacting with the system. Traditional system performance testing methodologies are
aimed at discerning the “best” design to use for a given aid or task. The obvious caveat
to this approach is that some users will be better at using the system than others. While
there is some natural variation among humans in their ability to perform a given task, for
basic functions this variation is very small with the performance variation increasing in
conjunction with the complexity of the task. The entire purpose of decision aids,
however, is to reduce the complexity of a task as a means of improving performance
(Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2013).
When testing a new system design for a task, common practice is to compare
performance versus standards established using trained personnel and deployed systems.
While this comparison has the obvious benefit of ensuring that the new system is worth
implementing, it does have an obscure flaw. The best users of a system—the experts
used to compare system performance—are those that are not only trained to use the
system, but have the natural mindset and intuitive grasp of both the system and the
objectives related to its use to perform above average. Take, for example, the
comparison of keyboards between the “standard” QWERTY and the Dvorak layouts.
When testing whether the Dvorak layout would net an improvement in typing speed, it is
obviously not sufficient to simply give an expert typist a Dvorak keyboard and then
compare the performance with that expert’s performance using the QWERTY layout.
This sort of test is biased in favor of the status quo since the training and, in the case of
cognitive functions, natural information processing bent of the individual is in favor of
3

the existing design. In short, what makes the person an expert is their natural aptitude
combined with their proficiency at using a given system. When system designs are being
tested using experts to compare new versus old designs, the performance of the new
design is inherently confounded with the natural information processing style of the
experts—who are considered experts because of their aptitude with the old system.
Testing, therefore, should attempt to mitigate this confounding effect by taking steps to
mitigate this bias.
The ideal decision aid, then, is tailored specifically to the individual mental
process of the operator using it. While this state of customization is the theoretical ideal,
it has three major problems associate with it. First, the actual mental processes associated
with information acquisition are currently impossible to observe. Second, that while
there exist excellent functional models describing the entire human information
processing activity (Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2013), there are few
models that deal specifically with the perception of presented information. Finally, it
would be functionally impossible to design specifically for each user of a system from the
perspectives of both cost and time.

4

II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
For the current research, several questions relating to human-machine
performance were chosen for investigation:
1) Can a functional model be developed describing the human information
transformation process?
2) Is there a detectable difference in performance based on the correlation
between personality factors and graphical versus textual information
presentation format?
3) Is there a behavioral difference based on the correlation between personality
factors and graphical versus textual information presentation format?

5

III. BACKGROUND
HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING

One of the problem with modern human-machine system performance is that the
simple problems have become automated to the point that only the most critical decisions
are presented to the human for supervisory decision (Rovira, McGarry, & Parasuraman,
2007). As each decision a human makes carries higher weight—and mistakes tend to
have greater consequences— the ability of an automated system to rapidly analyze realtime data and support satisfactory decisions is critical and depends greatly on presenting
appropriate data to the user. Modern aiding systems can easily augment the raw data
flow with correlative data beyond the point of a user’s cognitive saturation (Gibbs,
Fendley, Hoenle, & Paul, 2013). When designing a system to aid human decisionmaking, then, it is necessary to analyze and consider the processes of human sensing,
perception, and decision-making within the system. A better understanding of human
processes will allow the designers of a system to minimize interference with those
processes.
Human information processing has been extensively studied in an effort to
understand how humans receive, process, and respond to sensory information. Wickens
(1992) proposed one of the most popular models, positing a process flow with a sensory
stimulus for an input (Figure 1). This sensory input feeds into the human perception
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stage of the model, taking into account previous experience via long-term memory. From
the moment of perception, the human engages in a feedback loop with working memory
to make an action decision or response. Once a decision has been made, the human
executes the response, which feeds back into future stimuli and perceptions. This model
of human information processing forms the basis for the work regarding human
perception presented here.

Figure 1: Wickens’ Information Processing Model—adapted from Wickens (1992)
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SYSTEM DESIGN PERFORMANCE

The best performance for any Joint Cognitive System (JCS) is achieved when
interaction between the human and machine is considered from the beginning.
Parasuraman (2000) describes how it is necessary to consider the interaction of the
human in the JCS with the varying levels of automation for each stage of Wickens’
information processing model (Wickens, 1992). The model itself is described in detail in
the work by Parasuraman, Sheridan, and Wickens (2000). The essence of JCS design
philosophy revolves around building both a task-specific interaction model that takes into
account the human’s mental processes as well as optimizing the design of the machine
ion portion of the JCS to fit the constructed mental model.
From an engineering standpoint, the end goal of investigating human information
processing is to design a JCS that reduces workload on the human. This allows the
human to perform “better,” whether by improving work rate or accuracy. Recognition
Primed Decision-making (RPD), for instance, describes a process by which humans use
prior experience to quickly make choices with imperfect information (Wickens et al.,
2013). A system designed for use with an RPD-appropriate scenario, then, would
logically attempt to present necessary information in a consistent format so that the data
patterns trigger recognition more easily. The challenge comes when designing complex
systems whose component functions cannot be directly described by high-level models
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such as RPD. In these cases, a mental model specific to the task at hand will need to be
constructed in order to identify design constraints (Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997).
The construction of a mental model is, itself, not a simple task. When designing
an experimental setup, it is necessary to consider the various constraints and goals of the
experiment. McNeese, Bautsch, and Narayanan (1999) describe a methodology for
selecting experimental criteria. As it is often impossible to observe subjects in a realworld setting, a concurrent protocol with a simulation can be useful in building an
understanding of the human behavior being observed. This is the key—that at some
point, regardless of the information acquisition protocol used, it is necessary to build a
working mental model to describe the decision process of the human involved in the
system being engineered.

PERCEPTION

INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLES

From the standpoint of visual analysis, attention is directly related to the object
perception stage of the information processing model. (Wickens et al., 2013) This
represents a “pre-processing” stage whereby extraneous sensory data is discarded in favor
of extracting visual features salient to the task at hand. (Borji, Sihite, & Itti, 2013) While
it may seem the most direct route to measure attention in visual scanning tasks via direct
measurement of the individual’s gaze—and this is indeed pertinent and the basis for our
9

understanding of visual attention—it must be noted that a growing body of research
indicates that extracted information does not always directly correlate to the actual
fixation of the focus of an individual’s gaze. (Borji & Itti, 2013; Engbert & Kliegl, 2003;
Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005)
Aside from instances of covert attention, the most commonly-observed behavior
is that people tend to focus on the location where they have directed their attention. This
follows naturally from the physiological structure of the eye and the distinctions between
foveal, parafoveal, and peripheral vision. (Holmqvist, Nyström, Andersson, Dewhurst,
Jarodzka, & Van de Weijer, 2011) In most cases, particularly in high-performance
situations such as piloting, the focal point of an individual’s gaze is a good indicator of
their attention. (Holmqvist et al., 2011; Nygren & Allard, 1996)
When presented with raw sensory stimuli, individuals must transform the stimulus
into relevant units of meaning as determined by their current attention allocation. How
an individual goes about this is termed their “Information Processing Style” or
“Cognitive Style” (Leonard, Scholl, & Kowalski, 1999, Tuttle & Kershaw, 1998). Note
that this is distinct from the mental models discussed previously. A mental model
describes how a person acts upon interpreted data, whereas a person’s information
processing style or cognitive fit describes how they extract meaningful data from the
world around them. This process is, however, largely sub-conscious (Kouider, 2007).
Most research to date in the area of information processing styles has focused
specifically on the specialized area of “learning styles”—that is, the methods by which
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people, usually in an academic setting, process, integrate, and apply knowledge in
specific subject areas (Lau, Yuen, & Chan, 2015; Kyndt, Cascallar, & Dochy, 2012).
This is convenient since academic environments are extremely controlled with known,
easily-measured response outcomes. Findings have largely confirmed what teachers and
instructors have preached for millennia—that each person learns and understands topics
in their own manner. It is possible, though, to group similar-behaving persons and
classify their general learning style. Without embarking on an in-depth discussion of
educational and vocational learning styles, there is a particular set of findings that is
useful for engineering the perception aspect of a human-machine system.
Of particular utility in the process of engineering a joint cognitive system is the
concept of cognitive fit. The theory of cognitive fit describes how information
presentation formats and data visualization techniques can be used to support decision
support systems (Vessey & Galletta, 1991; Speier, 2006). Previous research has
indicated that using specific information presentation formats can improve human
decision-making performance in joint cognitive systems (Card, Mackinlay, Shneiderman,
1999; Tegarden, 1999; Ware, 2012; Chen, 2013). Tegarden (1999) indicates that the
availability of multiple information presentation formats allow for a better match to an
individual’s perceptual bent and thus allow them to interact more completely with the
data.
As mentioned previously when discussing Wickens’ framework (2013),
memory—specifically working memory—plays a key role in the ability of students at
11

universities to understand new information in high-stimulus situations (Kyndt, Cascallar,
& Dochy, 2012). Additionally, also in line with the implications of Wickens’ work,
research has indicated that the positioning of stimuli within the visual field has an effect
on the eventual conscious perception of the stimulus (Borji, Sihite, & Itti, 2013). Other
indications of correlations between physiological measures and human performance exist,
covering the gamut from fluctuations in heartrate to changes in blink rate and pupil
dilation to the very movement of the eyes during periods of high mental workload
(Holmqvist et al., 2011).

PERSONALITY

Recent work has begun to use physiological indicators as predictors of human
responses (Holmqvist et al., 2011; Ikehara & Crosby, 2005; Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, &
Van Gerven, 2003). For most design work, however, the capability to directly measure,
calibrate, and quantify the physiological responses to stimuli is extremely limited, if it
exists at all. Research has tentatively indicated, however, that there is an older approach
that can indicate, in a general fashion, how a person will interact with a system:
personality (Marras & Hancock, 2014). The study of this phenomenon from a perceptual
engineering standpoint is still in its infancy, but it is possible to build a logical case for its
validity.
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From an engineering standpoint, it is often enough to know that the human needs
a certain level of machine aid for the task, not the specific reasons why the need exists.
In the field of psychology, experimental research has strongly indicated that certain
personality types are better suited for certain job types (Denissen, Ulferts, Lüdtke, Muck,
& Gerstorf, 2014). It is intuitive that a person who requires constant interpersonal
interaction would do poorly at a job that requires isolated concentration. At its base, the
entire field of personality research is about describing why certain people act the way
they do and predicting how they react to the world. Of interest to engineering humanmachine solutions, however, is the impact of an individual’s stress on their available
information processing resources. Kleiman and Riskind (2014) describe a correlation
between a certain subset of personality types and susceptibility to high stress in certain
situations. Given the breakdown of this behavior along personality type lines, it is
reasonable to assume that personality can serve as an indicator of particular design
considerations when building group-divergent models (Meneely & Portillo, 2005). From
an empirical standpoint, research suggests that personality plays a central role in
predicting user interaction habits for the purposes of user interface designs for certain
online software platforms (Nov, Arazy, López, & Brusilovsky, 2013).
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METHODOLOGY

PERSONALITY AND INFORMATION PROCESSING STYLES

There is no current existing technological solution for the problem of the
unobservable human perceptual process. Fortunately, for the purposes of system design,
direct observation is not necessary if a correlative indicator can be found. Personality
was chosen as the indicator of an individual’s information processing style. While
individual differences will always occur, people with similar personalities tend to think
and act in a similar manner (McGhee, Shields, & Birnberg, 1978; George, 1990,
Asendorpf, 2002). The ability to classify common approaches to problem solving
supports this concept.
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) propose that people approach
situations involving problems in one of two ways depending on their culture of origin:
analytically or holistically. Western individuals such as those from Europe and the
United States tend to consider a situation as composed of individual pieces, each of
which follows specific rules and behavior paradigms. Eastern individuals, such as those
from China, on the other hand, tend to process situations as a complete unit with each
part affecting every other part. There are advantages and disadvantages to each
approach, but the presence of definable patterns in the way humans process a situation
from the presented information is, in itself, lends credence to the intuitive proposition that
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personality classifications can be leveraged to describe functional categories of
interaction.
This is, in fact, the entire purpose of personality assessment—to try to
meaningfully categorize people by their thought processes. The aforementioned
influence of personality on learning styles and usability design provide evidence that
personality will be a good empirical analog for the individual information processing
style. This is especially true given the second problem of the need to be able to group
design recommendations. It is, of course, logistically challenging to custom design a
system interface for each individual. It is, however, reasonable to design for a small
number of groups of users, especially if one considers personality as a set of heuristic
responses to stimuli. A single design is rarely optimal for all users, and thus it is
necessary to consider more than just a single user type in the design process (Nov, Arazy,
López, & Brusilovsky, 2013). Given personality as an indicator of the overall
information processing style tendencies of a specific population, a model that could
provide a reasonable description of the basis for the differences in the information
processing styles of groups could also be used to make specific design recommendations
to improve the performance for each group.

15

PERFORMANCE METRIC

A widely-accepted metric was needed for model validation. In this case, signal
detection theory provided a comprehensive basis to compare performance as it includes a
single metric to compare not only positive hit rates, but also false alarm and miss rates.
At the base of any improvement that can be tested is the assumption of errors. If humans
performed perfectly, there would be little need for machines in many cases. Aside from
allowing a human to exceed the limits of their physical system, improvement in any JCS
tends to take the form of error reduction. This begs the question of which kind of errors
were relevant. Besides the ground truth of true or false, errors take two forms: either the
individual identified a positive solution when it should have been negative, or neglected
to identify an existing solution. The question then becomes which kind of error is more
tolerable for the system. In order to detect improvement in complex multidimensional
data, it was necessary to design a detection metric for both kinds of errors. Macmillan
and Creelman (2005) set forth a method for designing this metric in a d’ space. Based on
this method, an experiment was designed to test the validity of the proposed model.
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IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
While Wickens’ (2013) model serves as an excellent view of the information
processing method used by humans, it lacks the detail needed to identify exactly how a
system might be engineered to specifically augment the perception aspect of the
information processing loop. Especially given the complexities of human information
processing styles, a more detailed description of the specifics of each of the stages of the
information processing loop is needed. To that end, the following proposed model
describes the perception portion in more detail (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Proposed perception model

The focus of engineering efforts when designing a system usually center on some
sort of decision support system or augmentative aid designed to improve the decision and
response selection. Before reaching a decision, however, the user must internalize the
17

raw information he or she receives from visual senses. This process of constructing
discrete internal units of meaning is the focus of the model here.
It is important to note that, for the purposes of this model, the sensory information
has already passed the information store and been assigned attention and memory
resources. In addition, for the purposes of simplicity, only the processing of visual
stimuli will be considered. Palmer (1975) notes that attention and familiarity play such
major roles in interpreting sensory information that a person has trouble relating noncontextual sensory information even without recollection. He goes on to posit that, for
humans, the process of utilizing visual sensory information is a matter of constructing
internal icons that represent pieces of an internal schema. Rybak et al. (1998) expound
upon this concept and apply it to a neural simulation designed to replicate human visual
processing.
In both cases, however, raw visual data is first translated into an internal protoobject model. Then, based on available attention, the proto-model is compared to a
library of previously-experienced object models. Feature comparison and object detail
analysis continue until either a match has been made or enough data exists to formulate a
new mental model of the sensory data. It is this model—this icon—that is actually used
for the various mental processes associated with the data. Humans work with conceptual
structures of meaning rather than actual sensory data (Olson & Bialystok, 2014). This is
why people are susceptible to change blindness, cognitive biases, spatial perception
errors, and the like.
18

In this model, once the raw sensory data has passed through the attention filter, a
very basic proto-structure is constructed. For visual information, this represents the
foundational aspects of the visual data: whether an object is present, approximate size,
and movement of the object. This is the bare minimum needed to process basic reflex
responses. The limitations of this proto-construct are why a person will, when surprised,
duck to avoid a piece of paper or close their eyes if something is close to their face when
they turn around. Given more time, however, humans will begin to assign detail to an
object in an attempt to classify it.
In the model, once the proto-construct has been completed, a person will use the
current active contextual schema to narrow down the possible identifications of the
object. This combination of object and context schema pass through a contextual filter to
assign possible contextual meaning to the object. At this point, the person will compare
the object to the context data and potential identifications using an internal library. If a
positive match is made, the person will assign the matched model to the observation and
then pass on the result as a meaningful recognition of the mental icon chosen. If no
match is made, then more resources are allocated to refine the model. Once refined, the
new model is passed to the contextual filter and the process reiterates. This reiteration
continues until either a positive match to the person’s individual library has been
achieved or enough refinement of the object has taken place to create a new library entry
representing the new stimulus. In either case, the loop continues until either there are no
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more attention and memory resources to allocate or some sort of meaningful recognition
is made.
From a performance standpoint, the time it takes to perform a meaningful
recognition is directly proportional to the number of iterations required to sufficiently
refine the mental construct into a usable icon. While this implies that a more experienced
person with a larger icon library would be able to identify a visual stimulus more readily,
there are several caveats. First, it is assumed that sufficient resources of attention,
memory, and time are available. Also, just as in any system or comparison, the more
potentials that exist, the more difficult it becomes to quickly select the correct one. To
help with this process, humans tend to build mental heuristics (Gilovich, Griffin, &
Kahneman, 2002; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986; Klein, 1997; Wickens et
al., 2013)—that is, they tend to think of certain kinds of information in a particular way.
This allows them to reduce the dimensionality of the data necessary to construct a
functional mental icon in order to make faster comparisons. The tradeoff is that any
information not presented in the preferred manner requires more iterations through the
refinement process loop before the user can successfully transform the information into
the correct contextual schematic icon. Therefore, presenting visual information in a form
closer to the person’s mental iconic form should reduce the number of transformative
iterations and speed up the perception stage as a whole, allowing the user to move on to
the decision and response selection stage of Wickens’ model.
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V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
PARTICIPANTS

The 36 participants for this study were recruited from the Wright State University
community. Of the 36 participants, 18 were male and 18 females. Participants ranged in
age from 18 to 75 years old. No compensation was provided for participation in the
experiment. The stimulus design was validated by a pair of experts, and the experiment
was conducted entirely with novice subjects. This was deliberately sought so as to more
accurately measure natural responses without interference from prior training and
conditioned responses. Please see Appendix A for demographic summary figures.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experiment was a 3x2x2 within-subject design with repeated measures. The
within-subject factor was the available decision aid type: graphical, textual, or no aid.
Each level of the decision aid factor was repeated a total of 20 times for each subject with
two levels of the target condition: target present or target not present. For each level of
the decision aid factor, the target presence was indicated in the top video for 10 of the
trials and in the bottom video for the other 10 trials. The presentation order of each of the
60 stimuli was randomized for each participant. The design is illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Stimulus Distribution

Number of stimuli per participant for each factor level
Graphical Aid

Textual Aid

No Aid

True Target- Top

8

7

8

True Target- Bottom

8

7

7

False Target- Top

2

3

2

False Target- Bottom

2

3

3

APPARATUS AND STIMULI

The experiment was conducted in a sound and light-controlled room at Wright
State University. Eye tracking and key press data was collected using a Tobii T120 eye
tracker. All stimuli were presented on the screen of the Tobii T120.
For the Stroop test portion of the participant evaluation, participants were given a
single training image to practice naming the color and shape combinations on the screen
followed by three timed image sets. Each of the three sets consisted of three rows of four
color-shape combinations with corresponding colored labels underneath where the labels
named a different color and shape than was actually present. Participants were asked to
describe the color and shape actually present while ignoring the text underneath.
Completion time for each screen and number of incorrect answers given were recorded.
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Each stimulus in the primary test consisted of two video images arranged
vertically on the right hand side of the screen with the left hand side of the screen
reserved for instruction and aiding tool display. There were a total of 60 stimulus clips
presented, divided into three groups of 20 each. Group 1 represents the baseline
performance state and consisted of the two videos and an instruction chat window only,
with no other information present (Appendix B-1). Group 2 consisted of the two videos,
the chat window, and a graphical decision aid designed to represent a compass-like
representation of the text in the chat window (Appendix B-2). Group 3 consisted of the
two videos, the chat window, and a textual decision aid designed to simplify the text
displayed in the chat window (Appendix B-3). See Figure 3 for a summary example.

Figure 3: No-Aid stimulus (Left), Text Aid (Top Right), & Graphical Aid (Bottom Right)
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PROCEDURE

In order to test the proposed hypotheses, participants were asked to read and sign
an informed consent document. Next, in order to obtain personality data, the Big Five
Inventory (BFI) was administered (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, &
Soto, 2008; Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). This is a survey-format evaluation consisting
of 44 questions, each rated on a 5-point Likert scale. The final scores are tallied and used
to compute a mean score for each of the Big Five facets: extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. In addition to the BFI, a Stroop color and
word test was administered.
Before beginning the test, the participants were given a training scenario to
acclimate them to the experimental task. In the training scenario, they were given six
videos representing each of the actual experimental setups twice. Once the training was
completed, the participants were given a short break and an opportunity to ask clarifying
task-related questions. The participants were shown a total of 60 30-second video clips
constituting 20 trials for each aiding component arrangement. While the majority of the
clips contained correct target information, a number contained either false target
information or false direction information. These clips functioned as the “catch” trials for
d’ computation purposes. See Table 1 for the conditional summary. Participants were
asked to search for the target described in the chat window and press the space bar when
found. No audio information was provided. Upon completion of all trials, participants
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were asked to indicate their preference regarding the aiding component used and the age
group to which they belonged. Any additional comments were recorded during the
debriefing session.

Figure 4: Experimental Procedure
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VI. ANALYSIS & RESULTS
SDT / PERFORMANCE
The d’ measure from signal detection theory was chosen due to both its simplicity
and proven effectiveness in cognitive and psychological fields. The d’ metric is a
comparison of hits versus false alarms for a given scenario. In the ISR domain, it is not
sufficient to measure hit rates without considering the rate of false alarms. An excessive
rate of false positives can have obvious detrimental effects on operations beyond the
simple expenditure of resources. In short, using the d’ metric from signal detection
theory provides a compact comparison metric for both conditions.
The only potential drawback of using the d’ metric lies in the classification of
data. In this experiment, the signal presented (the target the user was told to find) was
only on-screen for a limited amount of time. In traditional signal detection theory, any
indication of a discovered target if one is present in the static stimulus is considered a hit.
As SDT has been applied to more complicated scenarios, some have argued for a
modification of this approach. Per Rothrock, Ling, and Narayanan (2011): if the subject
indicated a target was present during a non-catch trial, it was considered a hit only if it
fell within the time window that the target was viewable, otherwise it was considered a
false alarm.
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Both computation methods for the d’ metric have merit. When observing
complicated, fluid stimuli, it is possible that the user may make a decision regarding the
stimulus at an indeterminate point outside of the presented stimulus window. In this case,
the traditional classification method would accurately reflect this behavior. On the other
hand, the more strictly-enforced classification criterion is more strongly indicative of true
hits at the potential expense of delayed recognition. The experiment was designed to
minimize the effects of this ambiguity in either case, however, as with any real-world
stimulus, some potential for noise remains. Thus, analyses based on both classification
methodologies are presented. All analyses were performed using the JMP statistical
software package with statistical procedures as outlined by Montgomery & Runger
(2011).
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GRAPHS

Figure 5: Means of Personality Measures (Each error bar is constructed using 1
standard error from the mean)

Overall means for personality measures are as follows: Extraversion, 3.108;
Agreeableness, 4.108, Conscientiousness, 3.873; Neuroticism, 2.534; and Openness,
3.547. A Shapiro-Wilk W test for goodness of fit was performed on each personality
distribution. Of the five measures, only Agreeableness showed strong evidence of a nonnormal distribution (p = 0.0003). The other four measures showed no strong evidence of
a lack of normality in their distribution: Extraversion (p = 0.8257); Conscientiousness (p
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= 0.7562); Neuroticism (p = 0.6107); Openness (p = 0.0903). It should be noted that the
non-normality is due to a single outlier value. Given a sample size of 36, the results
correlate well with the population means presented by Smith, Hanges, and Dickson
(2001). Graphical representations of the means are presented in Figure 5, while
distributions are represented in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Distributions of Personality Measures
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STRICT D’ INTERPRETATION
The mean d’ measure for each aid condition—Graph, No Aid, and Textual is
presented in Figure 7. Mean d’ for the Graphical aid type was 0.0717, No Aid was 0.301,
and Textual was 0.145. Note that these values were calculated using the strict d’ measure
as described above across all participants.
Strict Mean(d') vs. Aid Type

Figure 7: Strict d' Means by Aid Type (Each error bar is constructed using 1 standard
error from the mean)
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STRICT CORRELATION MATRIX

A correlation matrix was constructed to compare the considered inputs. None of
the inputs indicated a particularly strong correlation. The highest indicated correlations
were Neuroticism/Openness with -0.4012, d’ Text – Graph/Openness with 0.3320,
Agreeableness/Neuroticism with -0.3105, Agreeableness/d’ Text – Graph with -0.3020,
Agreeableness/Openness with 0.2508, and Agreeableness/Extraversion with -0.2362. All
other correlations were less than an absolute value of 0.2000. The complete correlation
matrix is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Personality Measures with Strict d' Performance
Difference

Openness

d' Text - Graphic

1

-0.2362

-0.1621

-0.1343

0.0017

0.0165

Agreeableness

-0.2362

1

0.0127

-0.3105

0.2508

-0.302

Conscientiousness -0.1621

0.0127

1

-0.0087

-0.1431

-0.0986

Neuroticism

-0.1343

-0.3105

-0.0087

1

-0.4012

0.0853

Openness

0.0017

0.2508

-0.1431

-0.4012

1

0.332

d' Text - Graphic

0.0165

-0.302

-0.0986

0.0853

0.332

1
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Neuroticism

Conscientiousness

Agreeableness

Extraversion

Extraversion

LENIENT
The mean d’ measure for each aid condition—Graph, No Aid, and Textual is
presented in Figure 8. Mean d’ for the Graphical aid type was 0.0717, No Aid was 0.301,
and Textual was 0.145. Note that these values were calculated using the lenient d’
measure as described above across all participants.
Lenient Mean(d') vs. Aid Type

Figure 8: Lenient d' Means by. Aid Type (Each error bar is constructed using 1 standard
error from the mean)
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LENIENT CORRELATION MATRIX
A correlation matrix was constructed to compare the considered inputs. None of
the inputs indicated a particularly strong correlation. The highest indicated correlations
were Neuroticism/Openness with -0.4012, Agreeableness/Neuroticism with -0.3105,
Agreeableness/d’ Text – Graph with -0.2756, Agreeableness/Openness with 0.2508,
Agreeableness/Extraversion with -0.2362, and d’ Text – Graph/Openness with 0.2377.
All other correlations were less than an absolute value of 0.2000. The complete
correlation matrix is presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Personality Measures with Lenient d' Performance
Difference

d' Text - Graph

Openness

Neuroticism

Conscientious-

ness

Agreeableness

Extraversion

Extraversion

1

-0.2362

-0.1621

-0.1343

0.0017

-0.1059

Agreeableness

-0.2362

1

0.0127

-0.3105

0.2508

-0.2756

Conscientiousness -0.1621

0.0127

1

-0.0087

-0.1431

-0.0196

Neuroticism

-0.1343

-0.3105

-0.0087

1

-0.4012

0.1551

Openness

0.0017

0.2508

-0.1431

-0.4012

1

0.2377

d' Text - Graph

-0.1059

-0.2756

-0.0196

0.1551

0.2377

1
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

STROOP TEST

In the Stroop test, six participants missed a significant number of color-shape
combinations. Given a total of 36 individual color-shape combinations, “significant” was
defined as identifying four or more color-shape combinations incorrectly. There were no
correlations found between the personality factors alone and the number missed on the
Stroop test, nor was there any significant predictive correlation between the number
missed on the Stroop test and the difference between the textual and graphic d’ measures.
These results are the same between both the extreme and complete data subsets.
There is, however, a difference in results when including the difference between
the graphic and text d’ measure for each participant as a factor versus the number missed
on the Stroop test. For the complete set of 36 subjects, no significant interactions were
found when including the difference between the textual and graphic d’ measures as an
interactive factor with the personality measures. However, for a smaller subset of the 18
most extreme participants, significant interactions were found for the same test. In an
effort to highlight personality traits among individuals strongly disposed to one aid type
or the other, the 18 most centric subjects— as determined by the difference in d’ scores
between the textual and graphical aid conditions— were excluded from the Stroop
analysis, leaving the 18 subjects with the overall highest preference for either graphic or
textual aid presentation formats. As above, results were calculated separately for both the
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lenient and strict d’ as the different methods give different d’ measures for each
participant. The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. Note that while a second-order
analysis was constructed, it was necessary to compute a reduced model due to limitations
imposed by the available degrees of freedom. Second-order terms with the smallest
estimated t-ratio were eliminated in a stepwise manner to arrive at each final model.
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Table 4: Stroop Test Performance by Difference in Aid Type d’ (lenient)

Source (Lenient R2 = 0.9999)

Estimated

P-Value

Effect
Openness

-39.4174

0.00098

Extraversion*Neuroticism

15.45034

0.00104

Conscientiousness

-17.3979

0.00113

Extraversion

-70.4961

0.00116

Conscientiousness*Openness

-31.026

0.00132

Extraversion*Conscientiousness

-29.3765

0.00134

Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

-22.0115

0.00147

Agreeableness*d' Text - Graph

30.60691

0.00161

Extraversion*Agreeableness

-18.1199

0.00175

Agreeableness

-19.2577

0.00209

d' Text - Graph

-7.73148

0.00282

Neuroticism

-10.2553

0.00421

Extraversion*d' Text - Graph

7.00788

0.00615

Agreeableness*Openness

-10.285

0.00667

Agreeableness*Neuroticism

-5.19519

0.00818

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness

22.92594

0.01057
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Table 5: Stroop Test Performance by Difference in Aid Type d’ (strict)

Source (Strict R2 = 0.9999)

Estimated

P-Value

Effect
Extraversion

-52.8396

0.0032

Agreeableness

-87.9652

0.00334

Neuroticism

-49.932

0.0036

Extraversion*Neuroticism

-88.3213

0.0036

d' Text - Graphic

-87.0775

0.00365

Agreeableness*Openness

-33.8941

0.00375

Conscientiousness*Openness

-193.517

0.00379

Neuroticism*Openness

-28.2543

0.0038

Extraversion*Agreeableness

69.32393

0.00381

Extraversion*Openness

-141.613

0.00388

Extraversion*d' Text - Graphic

269.8297

0.0039

Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

-157.077

0.00401

Conscientiousness

-20.8095

0.00415

Agreeableness*Neuroticism

-49.431

0.00552

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness

19.17978

0.02066

Openness

-0.26309

0.10319

37

AREAS OF INTEREST

To determine component usage, a selection of heat maps constructed from
accumulated fixations was analyzed. Overall, the majority of the time was spent viewing
the videos, with early fixations on the chat window and aid. Notably, three participants
had high numbers of stimuli where they did not fixate on the decision aid at all. In each
case, the lack of focus was mirrored in the component order results computed using Time
to First Fixation method described below. See Appendix C for examples of participant
heat maps.
In considering behavioral characteristics, eye tracking Time to First Fixation
measures were used for each of the four components. The components were ordered for
each sample based on the measured Time to First Fixation, then the mean order taken for
each subject. The top nine performers for each of the Graphic and Textual aids were
selected and the personality factors compared. The statistical analysis showed no
significant effects, mainly due to the limitation of degrees of freedom, however, there
appears to be somewhat of a pattern apparent as shown in Figure 9. Note that in the
figure, the component order is represented by a four-letter code. The code is ordered by
the fixation times, and the letters correspond to Aid, Chat, Top Video, and Bottom Video.
Thus, CATB would indicate that the average AOI fixation order was Chat, Aid, Top
Video, and finally Bottom Video. The apparent pattern deals with the groupings based
on best aid performance. While none of the Graphically-inclined participants looked at
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the Top Video first, three of the sampled Textual Participants tended to look there first.
Likewise, none of the Textually-inclined participants tended to start with the bottom
video first, while three of the Graphically-inclined participants did. Likewise, only the
Graphically-inclined participants tended to look at the Chat component, then immediately
to the Aid component. Textually-inclined participants instead tended to look at the aid
after they looked at one or both of the video components. In all, the results are
inconclusive, but with a much larger sample size, some sort of definite trend might
emerge.

Figure 9: Personality Measures & Component Order by Best Aid Type
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From the graph of the component order without regard to Textual or Graphical
Aid Type, it can be seen that the Chat component tends to be the first viewed item,
followed by the videos and finally the aid. The lack of clear order in the viewing of the
videos is expected, given that the target could appear in either and there is no
distinguishing characteristic between them other than position on the screen. These
results are summarized in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Component Hit Order by Time to First Fixation
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Figure 11 shows the mean Time to First Fixation broken down by component.
While it is worth noting that the expected behavior of viewing the chat early in the
stimulus in order to obtain target information is clearly observed, it would also be
expected that the aid would be used early on as well. Instead, even in cases where the aid
was observed, there were a substantial number of cases where the aid was not observed
until over half of the stimulus time had elapsed. One potential explanation relates to the
necessity of an “orientation time” needed to get used to the videos. Several participants
noted that they would have used the aid more often, but were concerned that they might
miss the target given the short time window.

Figure 11: Outlier Box Plots of Time to First Fixations (Seconds)
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REGRESSION / ANOVA

The statistical analysis was performed in three stages. First, for the primary goal
of correlating performance with a particular information processing style, the five factors
in the personality profile were compared to the d’ rating for each subject through a thirdorder interaction, including the information aid type as a factor. Next, based on these
results, a further analysis was performed to detect personality correlations for each
particular aid type. Thirdly, as a further extension, a comparative analysis was performed
on the differences between the d’ scores of the graphical and textual aids only (excluding
the No Aid condition) using a reduced model. Comparison graphs showing the perparticipant d’ ratings classified by aid type are available in Appendix D for both lenient
and strict d’ interpretations. The premise for this choice lies in the desire to determine an
individual’s bent toward one information processing style or the other rather than a raw
prediction of score using a particular aid. In this case, the score for the Graphical Aid
was subtracted from the Textual Aid. A negative number would indicate a higher d’
score for the participant using the Graphical Aid while a positive number would indicate
a higher d’ score for the participant using the Textual Aid. For all analyses, statistical
significance is considered to be at α = 0.05 with near-significance at α = 0.10.
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STRICT D’ INTERPRETATION
The ANOVA for the comparison of the aid types and Big 5 personality scores
indicates that there is strong evidence that at least one factor strongly influential in the
resulting d’ score, as noted in Table 5. The individual significant and near-significant
factors are noted in Table 6. It is of note that across all interactions through the 3rddegree, the largest significant effect sizes are from the
Extraversion*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism interaction (0.65587) and the
Extraversion*Agreeableness (0.457411) interaction.

Table 6: ANOVA of Strict d' by Aid Type
ANOVA for d’ by Aid Type
Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square F Ratio

Prob > F

Model

57

1.7737714

0.031119

<.0001

Error

50

0.4761378

0.009523

C. Total

107 2.2499092

43

3.2678

Table 7: Notable Effects for Strict d' by Aid Type

Strict d'

Estimated

P-Value

(R2 = .7884)

Effect

Aid Type[None]

0.138521

<.0001

Aid Type[Graph]

-0.08741

0.0001

Extraversion*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

0.65587

0.0045

Agreeableness

-0.25818

0.0111

Extraversion*Agreeableness

0.457411

0.013

Openness

0.140011

0.0181

Openness*Aid Type[Graph]

-0.07204

0.0387

Extraversion

-0.1074

0.0781

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness

0.287054

0.082

Extraversion*Agreeableness*Openness

0.399628

0.0858

After performing an ANOVA and regression analysis on the personality factors
via the d’ measure, the same analysis was performed for each of the aid types separately.
From performing an ANOVA within each of the three types of decision aid states, there
is no strong evidence of any variance among the means of the d’ measure (Graphical Aid:
p = 0.6665; No Aid: p = 0.7891; Textual Aid: p = 0.2139). While there is no strong
overall evidence of variation in the means of the aid types, there is strong evidence that
certain personality interactions may influence subject performance for the Textual Aid:
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Extraversion*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism (p = 0.0405), Agreeableness (p = 0.0488),
and Openness (p = 0.0519).
Finally, a regression analysis and ANOVA was performed on a reduced model of
the difference between the d’ measures of the textual and graphical aid types, excluding
the “No Aid” condition. The ANOVA for the reduced model of the difference in the
Textual versus the Graphical d’ shows strong evidence of variance among the included
factor interactions (Table 8). Likewise, three of the factor interactions show strong
evidence of effect with another four showing weak evidence (Table 9). The final
prediction expression is provided below.

Table 8: ANOVA using Strict d' for Reduced Model Difference between Graph and Text
Aids
ANOVA for Reduced Text d’ – Graph d’
Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square F Ratio

Prob > F

Model

16

0.42147

0.026342

0.0471

Error

19

0.22273

0.011723

C. Total

35

0.6442
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2.2471

Table 9: Interactions using Strict d' for Reduced Model Difference between Graph and
Text Aids
Strict Reduced d’ Text – Graphic

Estimated

(R2= 0.6543)

Effect

Openness

0.169492

0.0027

Extraversion*Conscientiousness

-0.22376

0.0065

Agreeableness

-0.16728

0.0498

Extraversion*Openness

-0.11258

0.0779

Conscientiousness*Openness

-0.17514

0.079

Agreeableness*Openness

-0.1678

0.0877

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness

0.202991

0.0916

Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

-0.12278

0.1367

Extraversion*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

0.26854

0.2001

Extraversion

-0.04763

0.2691

Neuroticism*Openness

-0.049

0.4189

Extraversion*Neuroticism

-0.03821

0.6781

Neuroticism

0.013199

0.7471

Agreeableness*Neuroticism

-0.02395

0.803

Extraversion*Agreeableness

-0.01647

0.8994

Conscientiousness

0.002519

0.9605
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P-Value

Prediction Expression:
0.2540 + −0.0476 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + −0.1673 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.0025 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.0132 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 0.1695 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
(−0.0165 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 4.1080) ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076)) +
(−0.2238 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735)) +
(−0.0382 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (−0.1126 ∗
(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (0.2030 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
4.1080) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735)) + (−0.0240 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
4.1080) ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (−0.1678 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 4.1080) ∗
(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (−0.1228 ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735) ∗
(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (−0.1751 ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735) ∗
(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (−0.0490 ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347) ∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
3.5472)) + (0.2685 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735) ∗
(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347))
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LENIENT D’ INTERPRETATION
The ANOVA for the comparison of the aid types and Big 5 personality scores
indications that there is strong evidence that at least one factor strongly influential in the
resulting d’ score, as noted in Table 10. The individual significant and near-significant
factors are noted in Table 11. It is of note that across all interactions through the 3rd
degree, the largest significant effect size is from the
Agreeableness*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism interaction (-0.60344).

Table 10: ANOVA of Lenient d' by Aid Type
ANOVA for d’ by Aid Type
Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square F Ratio

Prob > F

Model

57

3.546662

0.062222

0.0037

Error

50

1.465908

0.029318

C. Total

107 5.01257
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2.1223

Table 11: Notable Effects for Lenient d' by Aid Type

Source

Estimated

P-Value

Effect
Lenient d' (R2 = .7076)
Aid Type[None]

-0.15237

0.0001

Aid Type[Graph]

0.120531

0.0018

Openness*Aid Type[Graph]

-0.19393

0.002

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism -0.60344

0.0465

Agreeableness*Aid Type[Graph]

0.158817

0.0605

Agreeableness*Openness*Aid Type[Graph]

-0.22464

0.0674

After performing an ANOVA and regression analysis on the personality factors
via the d’ measure, the same analysis was performed for each of the aid types separately.
From performing an ANOVA within each of the three types of decision aids, there is no
strong evidence of any variance among the means of the d’ measure (Graphical Aid: p =
0.4520; No Aid: p = 0.9582; Textual Aid: p = 0.3313). While there is no strong overall
evidence of variation in the means of the aid types, neither is there strong evidence any
personality interactions influence subject performance for any of the aids. There is,
however, weak evidence that certain personality interactions affect the performance with
the Graphic aid type: Openness (p = 0.0506), Extraversion*Agreeableness*Openness (p
= 0.0676), Agreeableness*Conscientiousness*Openness (p=0.0808), and
Conscientiousness*Openness (p = 0.951).
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Finally, a regression analysis and ANOVA was performed on a reduced model of
the difference between the d’ measures of the textual and graphical aid types, excluding
the “No Aid” condition. The ANOVA for the reduced model of the difference in the
Textual versus the Graphical d’ shows strong evidence of variance among the included
factor interactions (Table 12). Likewise, two of the factor interactions show strong
evidence of effect (Table 13). The final prediction expression is provided below.

Table 12: ANOVA using Lenient d' for Reduced Model Difference between Graph and
Text Aids
ANOVA for Reduced Text d’ – Graph d’
Source

DF

Sum of

Mean Square

F Ratio

Prob > F

2.3128

0.0416

Squares
Model

16

1.685314

0.105332

Error

19

0.865326

0.045543

C. Total

35

2.55064
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Table 13: Interactions using Lenient d' for Reduced Model Difference between Graph
and Text Aids
Lenient Reduced d’ Text – Graphic

Estimated Effect

P-Value

Openness

0.345572

0.0021

Agreeableness*Openness

0.414969

0.0358

Neuroticism*Openness

-0.18874

0.1228

Extraversion*Neuroticism

-0.26655

0.1522

Neuroticism

0.107207

0.1935

Extraversion*Conscientiousness

-0.18174

0.223

Agreeableness*Conscientiousness

0.248938

0.2827

Extraversion*Agreeableness

-0.27927

0.2842

Agreeableness

-0.16376

0.3111

Conscientiousness

-0.09432

0.3519

Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

-0.14119

0.3759

Extraversion*Conscientiousness*Neuroticism

-0.31979

0.4325

Extraversion

-0.02875

0.7312

Extraversion*Openness

0.023017

0.8488

Agreeableness*Neuroticism

0.012063

0.9491

Conscientiousness*Openness

0.002421

0.9897

(R2= 0.6607)
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Prediction Expression:
−0.4909 + −0.0288 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + −0.1638 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
−0.0943 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 0.1072 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 + 0.3456 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +
(−0.2793 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 4.1080) ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076)) +
(−0.1817 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735)) +
(−0.2666 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (0.0230 ∗
(𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (0.2489 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
4.1080) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735)) + (0.0121 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
4.1080) ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (0.4150 ∗ (𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 4.1080) ∗
(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (−0.1412 ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735) ∗
(𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347)) + (0.0024 ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.8735) ∗
(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 3.5472)) + (−0.1887 ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347) ∗ (𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
3.5472)) + (−0.3198 ∗ (𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 3.1076) ∗ (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 −
3.8735) ∗ (𝑁𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑚 − 2.5347))
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DISCUSSION

As noted, a Stroop test was administered as a preliminary assessment to explore
the possibility of a secondary indicative measure. The analysis of the results from the
Stroop test alone is inconclusive for the purposes of predicting performance. However,
as the work of Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski (1999) indicated should be the case, the
results of the Stroop test are suggestive of the core hypothesis that each individual has a
“default” when it comes to processing presented information. This case is further
strengthened by the results from the regression analysis of the personality factors with aid
type as factor that indicate that the type of aid played a significant role in the performance
of the participants.
The correlations in overall performance, as described by the d’ measure, parallel
conventional analysis approach to finding the ideal personality type for a particular task.
Of interest in particular to the original hypothesis, however, is firstly whether
performance differences can be identified between information presentation types. While
most individuals showed only a minor preference for one aid or the other, a significant
portion of the subjects showed a strong performance preference for either graphical or
textual information, but not both.
While the individual performance-aid predictors remain elusive, the data does
support the information processing model presented for testing as the primary hypothesis.
Based on the data, the proposed model fits the existing evidence: there are definite
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performance differences in individuals dependent on the format of the information
presented, with some performing better with a given format and the rest with another.
These performance differences can be explained as the individual spending more time in
processing; the refinement loop transforming the acquired sensory data into a meaningful
internal icon. In essence, it takes longer to codify the sensory information depending on
the degree in the difference of cognitive fit.
In addition, the performances of the individuals with their personal “best” type of
information presentation are comparable, which is contrary to the concept that there is
one particular “best” type of person for a task. At least in the case of complex modern
decision-aided scenarios, the “best” performers will be the ones with the closest natural
information processing match to the presented decision aid.
Despite two methods of computation for the d’ performance metric, it appears that
BFI measures of Openness and Agreeableness show a high level of involvement in
determining with which aid type the individual will demonstrate the best performance.
While no concrete claims of predicting the native cognitive fit (see Vessey & Galletta,
1991; and Speier, 2006) of an individual can be made, there does appear to be sufficient
evidence of interaction among personality traits to point to a correlation between
personality and unskilled task affinity using a particular aid type. It is likely that a larger
sample size is needed in order to examine all 6th-order interactions of personality and aid
type.
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When viewing the categorization of component sequencing outlined by the AOI
analysis, a trend seems apparent, although the statistical test failed to show significance.
Again, this can be attributed to a small sample size along with a limited number of
potential sequences. A more detailed AOI map may produce more concrete results.
The proposed model accounts for the observed affinity for a particular
information presentation format and provides a reasonable explanation for the causal
mechanism. It appears that the population falls along a normal distribution of
performance between the two aids, with the majority of people able to function
approximately the same with either aid. Personality does appear to be an indicator of this
preference, but further research with a larger sample size is needed to account for more
complex interactions.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
Regarding the ISR domain, proper operator responses in time-sensitive situations
is vital to mission performance. To this end, operator training and support system
development both play crucial roles. Traditionally, personality profiling has been used to
identify likely top performers based on task aptitude. Systems development has followed
the preferences of the these top performers, but this has led to an artificial scarcity in
ideal personnel as the decision support systems designed for the top performers selfselect for those with the best cognitive fit.
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Based on this study, three major benefits are highlighted for the ISR domain
predicated on modified system design considerations. First, with a model describing the
perceptual process, systems can be better designed to support the perceptual phase of
information processing rather than just the decision and response phases. Secondly, the
presence of different cognitive fits indicates the need for interface and information
presentation design customization to better fit the operator. In particular, since this is
predicated on a perceptual component influenced by an information presentation system,
it could take the form of different information display formats rather than a full system
redesign. Finally, the process of tailoring the information displayed to the cognitive fit of
the operator should expand the available pool of individuals capable of performing at the
highest level.
As a general extension of these results, there would be a similar advantage in any
application where rapid information acquisition is heavily influenced by human cognitive
fit. Apart from the obvious applications of medical information presentation or machine
operator support, the recognition of different cognitive fits can improve the design
principles used as the foundation for web applications as well as mobile device
interactions. In short, simply the recognition that potentially addressable differences
exist between user groups has the potential to further refine the information presentation
design paradigms already in existence. The presented model provides a framework to
explain such differences, and fits the initial experimental data. Further research is
needed, however, to explore the implications of this framework more fully.
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APPENDIX A: DEMOGRAPHICS
Table 14: Demographic information

18-20

20-30

30-40

40-50

50-60

60-70

70-80

Total

Females

1

12

2

0

2

0

1

18

Males

0

11

4

0

2

1

0

18

Figure 12: Mosaic plot of percentage demographic information.
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Figure 13: Aggregate Personality Measures across Participants
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APPENDIX B: AID TYPES
1: NO AID EXAMPLE

Figure 14: No Aid layout
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2: GRAPHICAL AID EXAMPLE

Figure 15: Graphical Aid layout
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3: TEXTUAL AID EXAMPLE

Figure 16: Textual Aid layout
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APPENDIX C: HEAT MAPS
1: NO AID EXAMPLE HEAT MAP

Figure 17: No Aid heatmap
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2: GRAPHICAL AID SAMPLE HEAT MAP

Figure 18: Graphical Aid heatmap
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3: TEXT AID SAMPLE HEAT MAP

Figure 19: Textual Aid heatmap
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APPENDIX D: TEXT VS GRAPHICAL D’ MEASURES
The figures presented here are an illustration of the differences in d’ measured between the Graphical and Textual aids for each
participant. The first figure represents the results calculated using the “lenient” d’ method, while the second figure represents the
“strict” d’ method. The Graphical aid score is on the left for each participant and the Textual aid score is on the right. Participants
have been sorted strictly by the higher aid score, with participants having a higher Graphical score in the top row and those with a
higher Textual score in the bottom row. As the scores for each aid type are represented on the same scale, the larger the separation
between the connected dots, the larger the difference between the scores.
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LENIENT D’

Figure 20: Per-subject comparison of Textual vs. Graphical Aid performance using lenient d'
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STRICT D’

Figure 21: Per-subject comparison of Textual vs. Graphical Aid performance using strict d'
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